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preference satisfaction that is to be maximized, on
how wide a scope is covered by 'all affected beings',
on whether it is a matter of actual or of expected
consequences, and so on.
Utilitarianism in all its forms is a consequentialist theory: what makes right acts right is their
consequences.
Very few modem moral philosophers are indifferent
to utilitarianism. The theory, in its many versions,
has lots of champions. Peter Singer is probably the
unabashed utilitarian best known to animal people.
Tom Regan is one of many who think utilitarianism
deeply mistaken. A third large group, of which I am a
member, think that utilitarianism is almost surely part
of any acceptable moral theory, but not the whole story.
Among moral philosophers the word 'utilitarian'
serves as an adjective meaning something like 'of the
sort connected with utilitarianism' and as a noun referring
to proponents of utilitarianism.
In the nonacademic world the 'utilitarianism' has
no ordinary use. The word 'utilitarian' serves as an
adjective describing an attitude. To take a utilitarian
attitude toward something is to value it only for its
usefulness (utility) as a means to some end. One takes
a utilitarian attitude to other people if one considers
them important only insofar as they impede or facilitate
one's own (or one's cause's) pleasure, promotion, or

Moral philosophers, like other professional groups,
use a body of technical terminology. Some of this
technical vocabulary is too unusual to be misapprehended. 'Deontology' and 'consequentialism', for
examples, have no normal English uses and so are
unlikely to confuse an outsider. (Obscurity, yes, but not
confusion.) Confusion is much more likely when a
technical term also has non-technical uses. Such
confusion, I fear, fairly frequently arises in connection
with the terms 'utilitarianism' and 'utilitarian'.
'Utilitarianism' in moral philosophy refers to a
theory of right action classically developed by Jeremy
Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick. On
this theory the right act to choose in any situation is the
one that will produce the greatest balance of pleasure
over pain for all affected beings. If no act is available
that will produce net pleasure, that act is right that will
produce the least net pain.
Utilitarianism comes in many forms (probably
over a hundred ifone counts all the variants), depending
on whether the principle is applied to choices of acts or
choices ofrules, on how broadly or narrowly 'pleasure'
and 'pain' are understood, on whether it is pleasure or
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power. A utilitarian attitude toward a tree values the
tree, if at all, as lumber. or perhaps as shade. but not for
its beauty and certainly not for its own sake. The
utilitarian attitude toward animals is demonstrated by
factory farms and the naming of state departments of
'natural resources'.
Utilitarianism, in most of its versions, is directly
opposed to such a utilitarian view of animals. The
pleasure and pain (or satisfaction and frustration) of
sentient beings is directly valued (positively or
negatively) by utilitarianism. The suffering of animals
matters directly. No real utilitarian (proponent of
utilitarianism) takes a utilitarian attitude (all that matters

is usefulness) toward a sentient being.
The confusion of the two senses of 'utilitarian' is
made even more likely by a common objection to
utilitarianism. This objection is that utilitarianism would
in many circumstances require the sacrificeofa minority
to maximize the satisfactionsofthe majority. Maybe so,
maybe not (the literabJre on the argument is immense).
But even in such a case utilitarianism requires that the
interests of all be taken equally into account. No
affected sentient being can be treated just as a means to
the ends of others.
Whatever else they may do, utilitarians don't take
a merely utilitarian view of animals.
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EASTERN, PACIFIC, AND CENTRAL DIVISIONS
The Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals meets
in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the
American Philosophical Association. Papers are
hereby invited for the December, 1991, Eastern
meeting, the March, 1992. Pacific meeting, and the
April, 1992, Central meeting.

• Companion animals and paternalism
• The ethics and epistemology of animal research
and soon.
The Society employs a system of blind reviewing for
the selection of papers for its programs. Papers must
be ten to fifteen pages long. double-spaced. Three
copies are required. with the author's name and any
other identifying infonnation on a separate title page.
Send papers to Professor Harlan B. Miller, Society for
the Study of Ethics and Animals. Department of
Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Blacksburg. Vrrginia 24061-0126. Be
sure to indicate which meeting is desired. Volunteers
to comment on papers should submit their names to
the same address. Deadlines are as follows:

Papers are welcome on any topic connected with
ethical issues affecting nonhuman animals. Possible
topics include:
• The moral (in)significance of being natural (rather
than domesticated or genetically engineered)
• The consonance (or lack thereof) ofAnimal Liberation Front actions with 11n animal rights ethic
• Historical studies of conceptions of the moral
standing of animals

1991 Eastern meeting
1992 Pacific meeting
1992 Central meeting

• Animals and the action ethics/virtue ethics
distinction
• The importance of animal issues to philosophy
and philosophers

Summer 1990

March 15, 1991
September 1, 1991
September 1, 1991

Papers accepted for meetings will automatically be
considered for publication in Between lilli. Species.
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